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Chevron, Greenwashing, and the Myth of
“Green Oil Companies”
Miriam A. Cherry† & Judd F. Sneirson‡
Abstract
As green business practices grow in popularity, so does the temptation
to “greenwash” one’s business to appear more environmentally and socially
responsible than it actually is. We examined this phenomenon in an earlier
paper, using BP and the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe as a case study and
developing a framework for policing dubious claims of corporate social
responsibility. This Article revisits these issues focusing on Chevron, an oil
company that claims in its advertisements to care deeply about the
environment and the communities in which it operates, even as it faces an
$18 billion judgment for polluting the Ecuadorean Amazon and injuring its
people. After describing Chevron’s “we agree” advertising campaign, the
Article sets out our framework for approaching “faux” corporate social
responsibility, gauges whether misled consumers and investors might have a
legal remedy as a result of Chevron’s advertising claims, and proposes
refinements to better regulate corporate greenwashing.
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I. Introduction
In the wake of the 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, amid public
backlash directed at BP in particular and the oil industry in general, the
Chevron Corporation rolled out a series of new advertisements broadly
agreeing with this popular sentiment and inviting critics to learn the
company’s positions on the environment and other sensitive subjects.1
According to a company press release, “[t]he campaign highlights the
common ground Chevron shares with people around the world on key energy
issues.”2 “We hear what people say about oil companies—that they should
develop renewables, support communities, create jobs and protect the
environment—and the fact is, we agree.”3
One of the advertisements touts Chevron’s commitment to renewable
energy, “agreeing” that we need to develop affordable, viable alternatives to
fossil fuels now, describing its progress in this area, and noting that it has
invested millions of dollars towards this end.4 Along similar lines, another
advertisement focuses on technology, “agreeing” that the company must
think like a technology company and making the case that it currently

1. See Advertising: The Power of Human Energy, CHEVRON CORP.,
http://www.chevron.com/about/advertising (last visited Sept. 4, 2011) (linking to the television
and print advertisements that form Chevron’s “we agree” campaign) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). As to the timing of the
campaign, see Ben Casselman, Chevron Ad Campaign Answers Critics Head-On, WALL ST. J.,
OCT.
18,
2010,
at
B10,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304250404575558363902469440.html
(“[T]he campaign comes as the industry is trying to recover from the [BP oil spill,
which] . . . only worsened the image of an industry that the public has consistently ranked dead
last among 25 business sectors . . . .”).
2. See Chevron Launches New Global Advertising Campaign: “We Agree,” CHEVRON
CORP.
(Oct.
18,
2010),
http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/10182010_chevronlaunchesnewglobala
dvertisingcampaignweagree.news (last visited Sept. 4, 2011) (introducing the ad campaign) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
3. See id. (quoting Rhonda Zygocki, Chevron’s Vice President of Policy, Government,
and Public Affairs).
4. See It’s Time Oil Companies Get Behind the Development of Renewable Energy,
CHEVRON CORP., http://www.chevron.com/weagree/?statement=renewables (last visited Sept.
5, 2011) (affirming Chevron’s long term commitment to renewable energy sources) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). Another ad,
agreeing that “oil companies need to get real,” offers somewhat of a counterpoint, stating that
fossil fuels “are the lifeblood of any modern economy,” that “no other form of energy is as
economical, as plentiful, or as reliable,” and therefore that oil must play a continuing role in
meeting the world’s energy demands. See id. (quoting Paul Siegele, President of Chevron
Energy Technology).
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does.5 Still another admits that the company makes considerable profits but
argues that it puts those profits “to good use,” reinvesting them in future
energy supplies, employing workers at good wages, paying billions in
taxes, helping communities and small businesses, and distributing profits to
shareholders “who rely on [Chevron] dividends.”6 And a final
advertisement “agrees [that] oil companies should support the communities
they’re part of.”7 When it partners with a country, Chevron continues, it
“commits for the long term,” and although Chevron does not claim to
“replace the role of government,” it strives to “make a difference” where it
operates, particularly in the areas of “health, education, and welfare.”8
Much of the “we agree” campaign echoes what the company terms
“The Chevron Way: Getting Results the Right Way.” According to the
company website, “Chevron Way” values include the following:
We conduct our business in a socially responsible and ethical manner.
We respect the law, support universal human rights, protect the
environment and benefit the communities where we work . . . . Integrity.
We are honest with others and ourselves . . . . We accept responsibility
and hold ourselves accountable for our work and our actions . . . .
Protecting People and the Environment. We place the highest priority
on the health and safety of our workforce and protection of our assets
and the environment.9

While Chevron’s website is replete with impressive testimonials,10 the “we
agree” campaign, and particularly statements like these last few, rankled
some.11 So much so that a rogue series of “we agree” advertisements soon

5. See Oil Companies Should Think More Like Technology Companies, CHEVRON
CORP., http://www.chevron.com/weagree/?statement=technology (last visited Sept. 5, 2011)
(quoting John W. McDonald, Chevron’s Vice President and Chief Technology Officer) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
6. See Oil Companies Should Put Their Profits to Good Use, CHEVRON CORP.,
http://www.chevron.com/weagree/?statement=growth (last visited Sept 5, 2011) (quoting
Patricia E. Yarrington, Chevron’s Vice President and Chief Financial Officer) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
7. See Oil Companies Should Support the Communities They’re A Part Of, CHEVRON
CORP., http://www.chevron.com/weagree/?statement=community (last visited Sept. 5, 2011)
(quoting Rhonda Zygocki) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate,
and the Environment).
8. See id. (describing Chevron’s positive impacts in partner countries).
9. The Chevron Way, CHEVRON CORP., http://www.chevron.com/about/chevronway
(last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate,
and the Environment).
10. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text.
11. See Adam Werbach, The Failure of Chevron’s New “We Agree” Ad Campaign, THE
ATLANTIC (Oct. 21, 2010 4:50 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/10/thefailure-of-chevrons-new-we-agree-ad-campaign/64951/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (stating that
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emerged, spoofing Chevron’s campaign so well that some news outlets
believed them authentic.12 Not surprisingly, the spoofs went further than
Chevron’s own platitudes, “agreeing” that “oil companies should clean up
their own messes,” “fix the problems they create,” “put safety first,” and
“stop endangering life.”13 One fake advertisement read:
Extracting oil from the Earth is a risky process, and mistakes do happen.
It’s easy to pass the blame or ignore the mistakes we’ve made. Instead,
we need to face them head on, accept our financial and environmental
responsibilities, and fund new technologies to avoid these mistakes in
the future.14

many of Chevron’s “good works . . . were required by law”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
12. See David Zax, Chevron’s New Ad Campaign is a Slick Yes Men Hoax, FAST
COMPANY (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.fastcompany.com/1695892/chevrons-new-adcampaign-makes-lemonade (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (“In retrospect, it does seem ridiculous
that any oil company would take such aggressive responsibility for oil spills, poor industry
safety, and exploitation of foreign resources.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Energy, Climate, and the Environment); see also Rupal Parekh & Michael Bush, Pranksters
Hijack Chevron Corporate-PR Efforts: What Do Marketers Do When Faced with Ads, Fake
Press Releases, Fake News Stories?, ADVERTISING AGE (October 18, 2010),
http://adage.com/print/146559 (last visited September 8, 2011) (explaining that some media
outlets had difficulty determining real ads from fake ones) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment); Stuart Elliott, Pranksters Lampoon
Chevron Ad Campaign, N.Y. TIMES MEDIA DECODER BLOG (Oct. 18, 2010),
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/pranksters-lampoon-chevron-ad-campaign/
(describing the spoofed ads and noting fooled news outlets) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
13. See Chevron—We Agree, RAINFOREST ACTION NETWORK ET AL.,
http://www.chevron-weagree.com (last visited Sept. 19, 2011) (displaying realistic but false
advertisements parodying Chevron’s “we agree” campaign) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). More parodies of the “we agree”
campaign followed, including a fake ad contest and viral videos with lines like the following:
Chevron executive, trying to understand the new ad campaign: “We say ‘we agree’ but we
don’t actually have to do anything?” Ad executive: “We are going to make pretending to care
the new caring.” Punk Chevron Video Contest, CHEVRONTHINKSWE’RESTUPID.ORG,
http://chevronthinkswerestupid.org/videogallery (last visited September 20, 2011) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment); see also
ChevronToxico: The Campaign for Justice in Equador, CHEVRONTOXICO,
http://chevrontoxico.com (last visited September 20, 2011) (promoting awareness about
Chevron’s lawsuit in Ecuador) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy,
Climate, and the Environment); We Can Change Chevron, Energy Shouldn’t Cost Lives,
RAINFOREST ACTION NETWORK, http://changechevron.org (last visited September 20, 2011)
(attempting to pressure Chevron into taking responsibility for the environmental damage in
Ecuador and elsewhere) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and
the Environment).
14. We
Punked
Chevron,
CHEVRONTHINKSWE’RESTUPID,
http://chevronthinkswerestupid.org/weagree (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
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What would trigger such a response? The answer lies in Chevron’s
other current public-relations effort: disclaiming responsibility for
environmental damage to the Amazon Rainforest in Ecuador.15 There, the
company is defending against a lawsuit seeking billions of dollars for
“environmental remediation, excess cancer deaths, impacts on indigenous
cultures, and unjust enrichment” stemming from Texaco’s activities there
between 1964 and 1992.16 All told, the company is said to have “dump[ed]
an estimated 18 billion[] gallons of toxic wastewater into [Ecuadorean]
rivers and streams and spill[ed] roughly 17 million gallons of crude oil into
the ancestral territory of six indigenous tribes.”17 Chevron acquired Texaco,
assuming its legal obligations, in 2001.18
The Ecuadorean plaintiffs originally brought suit in the United States
against Texaco in 1993, but the oil company successfully moved to dismiss
the case for forum non conveniens, leaving plaintiffs to litigate their claims,
if at all, back in Ecuador.19 Plaintiffs refiled their suit in Ecuador against
Chevron as Texaco’s successor in 200320 and won a staggering $18 billion
judgment on February 14, 2011,21 which Chevron is now appealing.22
15. See Elliott, supra note 12 (“The spoof is a direct consequence of Chevron’s trying to
fool people into thinking it is environmentally conscious when the company is responsible for
the extensive contamination found in Ecuador’s rain forest . . . .” (quoting a spokesperson for
the Ecuadorean plaintiffs)).
16. See CRUDE (Entendre Films 2009) (documenting the ongoing suit against Chevron
for oil pollution in Ecuador).
17. See Mitch Anderson, Chevron Adds Insult to Injury in the Amazon, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE CITY BRIGHTS BLOG (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/blogs/manderson/detail?entry_id=82541 (detailing the extent of the environmental damage)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
18. See In re Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 141, 143 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting
Chevron’s acquisition of Texaco). As a general rule, following a merger, a target’s liabilities
become the acquiror’s. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit., 8 § 259(a) (2010) (providing that a
target’s liabilities following a merger “attach to [the] surviving corporation[] and may be
enforced against it to the same extent as if said . . . liabilities . . . had been incurred or
contracted by it”).
19. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing
the case), aff’d, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384,
396 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting Texaco’s “promise[] that . . . it would ‘satisfy judgments that might
be entered in plaintiffs’ favor . . . subject to [its] rights under New York’s Recognition of
Foreign Country Money Judgments Act [dealing with fraud and due process]” (quoting an
earlier Texaco memorandum of law)).
20. See In re Chevron Corp., 749 F.Supp.2d at 143 (“Chevron is the target of litigation
brought in Ecuador by the so-called Lago Agrio plaintiffs in which the latter seek to recover
$113 billion for alleged environmental pollution by Texaco, Inc., from Texaco’s current
owner, Chevron Corporation.”). The film CRUDE, cited supra note 16, documents the lawsuit
in Ecuador and includes scenes where the court holds hearings in the field and hears arguments
from the lawyers just steps from oil-contaminated sites.
21. See Felicity Carus, Chevron Chiefs Face Shareholders After Huge $18bn Ecuador
Fine,
THE
GUARDIAN
(May
25,
2011),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/may/25/chevron-heads-shareholders-huge-fine
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Chevron’s position in the case is quite simple: whatever harm Texaco
wrought in Ecuador was done as part of a consortium with Ecuador’s
national oil company Petroecuador, and when Texaco withdrew from the
consortium in the 1990s, the Ecuadorean government released it from any
further environmental responsibility upon the completion of certain
remediation efforts.23 These were completed to the Ecuadorean
government’s satisfaction by 1998,24 and Chevron claims the resulting
release bars plaintiffs’ claims.25 Plaintiffs respond that the release covers
(breaking the judgment down as follows: $8.6 billion for environmental remediation, $860,000
to the named plaintiffs, and $8.6 billion in punitive damages) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
22. See id. (noting Chevron’s appeal efforts).
23. See Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 334, 342
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (describing Ecuador and Texaco’s 1995 contract).
24. See Texaco Petroleum, Ecuador and the Lawsuit Against Chevron, CHEVRON CORP.,
www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/texacopetroleumecuadorlawsuit.pdf (last visited Sept. 19,
2011) [hereinafter Texaco Petroleum] (noting Texaco’s remediation to the Ecuadorean
government’s satisfaction and the government’s subsequent release of Texaco from any
remaining environmental liability) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy,
Climate, and the Environment). Plaintiffs dispute whether Chevron adequately fulfilled these
obligations. See, e.g., Steven Donziger, The Chevron Way, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2009),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/16/chevron-texaco-crude-amazon-ecuador-opinionscontributors-steven-donziger.html (conveying the position of plaintiffs’ lawyer, Stephen
Donziger, that “[e]vidence at trial submitted by the plaintiffs demonstrates that Texaco’s
purported clean-up ignored the contaminated groundwater, rivers and streams, and consisted
primarily of dumping dirt over waste pits without adequately cleaning out the toxins”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
25. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Forum Shopper’s Remorse, CORPORATE COUNSEL (Apr.
1, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202445653516 (“Chevron says[]
Texaco abated the problem with a $40 million cleanup after it left the country, for which it
obtained a (much disputed) release from liability.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). Chevron also claims that the plaintiffs’
lawyers have improperly influenced the Ecuadorean courts, manufactured and falsified
evidence, and are generally trying to defraud and extort Chevron in the Ecuador litigation. See
Lawrence Hurley, Chevron Wins Restraining Order in $113B Pollution Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/02/09/09greenwire-chevron-wins-restrainingorder-in-113b-polluti-20818.html (discussing Chevron’s accusations) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). Chevron has also
obtained injunctive relief before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague under United
Nations trade law, arguing that Ecuador’s court system cannot fairly and independently hear
the case against it. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Arbitrators Order Ecuador to Suspend
Enforcement of Any Judgment Against Chevron, AMERICAN LAWYER (Feb. 10, 2011, 10:51
PM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/02/chevron021111.html (noting the
decision and Chevron’s accusations of fraud by plaintiffs’ lawyers) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). This is somewhat
ironic given the company’s earlier effort to have the case heard in Ecuador. See Goldhaber,
Forum Shopper’s Remorse, supra; see also Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing the case), aff’d, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002) (granting Chevron’s
motion for forum non conveniens in the United States). A federal court in New York recently
entered a similar order, which is now on appeal in the Second Circuit. See Chevron Corp. v.
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only governmental claims for environmental liability, not citizen-plaintiffs’
claims for personal injuries and other private harms the pollution is said to
have caused.26
Whatever the merits of the Ecuadorean action,27 Chevron’s critics cry
hypocrisy: “Chevron’s rhetoric and the public image that they put forward
[are] very different from how they’re actually operating.”28 While the
company claims to care about the communities in which it operates, and
particularly local health and welfare, its Ecuadorean track record and
litigation position belie its public statements.29 While the company claims
to prioritize the environment and accept responsibility for its actions, it
disclaims any obligation for the oil pollution its predecessor created that
continues to seep into water sources and, it is argued, severely impact
residents’ health.30 And while the company purports to put its considerable
profits to “good use,” those uses apparently include lobbying efforts to
repeal climate-change legislation,31 multinational litigation to evade
environmental responsibility, and superficial ad campaigns meant to
persuade critics, consumers, and investors of the company’s environmental
bona fides.32
Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (preventing the Ecuadorean plaintiffs
from immediately enforcing any Ecuadorean judgment against the company’s United States
assets); see also Mark Hamblett, Attorneys Spar Over Impact of Injunction in Chevron Case,
N.Y. L.J., May 11, 2011, http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202493524878
(reporting on the Second Circuit oral argument) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal
of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
26. See Goldhaber, Forum Shopper’s Remorse, supra note 25 (relating plaintiffs’
argument).
27. For more on the Ecuador lawsuit and related issues, see generally Chris Jochnick &
Nina Rabaeus, Business and Human Rights Revitalized: A New U.N. Framework Meets Texaco
in the Amazon, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 413 (2010); Cortelyou Kenney, Disaster in the
Amazon: Dodging “Boomerang Suits” in Transnational Human Rights Litigation, 97 CALIF. L.
REV. 857 (2009); Judith Kimerling, Indigenous Peoples and the Oil Frontier in Amazonia: The
Case of Ecuador, ChevronTexaco, and Aguinda v. Texaco, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 413
(2006); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C.
L. REV. 1081 (2010).
28. See Casselman, supra note 1, at B10 (discussing criticism of Chevron’s new ad
campaign); see also Elliott, supra note 12 (“Chevron’s trying to fool people into thinking it is
environmentally conscious when the company is responsible for extensive contamination found
in Ecuador’s rain forest and in other places as well.” (quoting a spokesperson for the
Ecuadorean plaintiffs)).
29. See Casselman, supra note 1, at B10 (contrasting Chevron’s “we agree” campaign
with Chevron’s corporate practices).
30. See Texaco Petroleum, supra note 24 (summarizing the company’s litigation
position).
31. See Casselman, supra note 1, at B10 (noting Chevron’s efforts to repeal a 2006
Californian climate-change law).
32. See Steven Mufson, Critics Spoof New Chevron Ads Promoting Responsibility,
WASHINGTON
POST,
Oct.
20,
2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/10/19/AR2010101904622.html (“When it comes to oil spills, climate
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In an earlier article, we examined a similar “green” advertising
campaign from another major oil company mired in an environmental
catastrophe.33 There, in the context of the BP oil spill, we explored what it
means to be a socially responsible corporation, noted consumer and
investor preferences for socially responsible behavior and goods and
services, and recognized a temptation for firms to appear to be more
socially responsible than they in fact are.34 We termed misleading corporate
social responsibility claims “faux CSR” and discussed various ways in
which the legal system could police this sort of corporate greenwashing.35
We draw on that framework here to determine whether the legal
theories we advanced in the previous article could provide redress to
consumers or investors misled by Chevron’s CSR claims.36 This Article
proceeds in two parts. In Part II, we offer some background on
greenwashing and CSR and set out the framework we established in the
earlier article for approaching faux CSR.37 In Part III, we apply this
framework to Chevron’s “we agree” campaign, gauge whether misled
consumers and investors might have a legal remedy as a result of Chevron’s
advertising claims, and refine the alternatives we developed to better
regulate corporate greenwashing.38
II. A Framework for Policing Greenwashing
American environmentalist Jay Westerveld coined the term
“greenwashing” in 1986 in response to a hotel’s efforts to encourage guests

change and human rights abuses, we need real action from Chevron. Instead we get this highcost glossy ad campaign.”) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and
the Environment); see also Casselman, supra note 1, at B10 (estimating the cost of the “we
agree” campaign at more than $90 million).
33. See Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate
Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV. 983, 1002–
09 (2011) (analyzing corporate social responsibility and greenwashing in the context of the BP
oil spill).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. We do not address securities-fraud claims that Chevron misled its shareholders about
the severity of the risks to the company from the Ecuadorean litigation. For such an analysis,
see Simon Billenness & Sanford Lewis, An Analysis of the Financial and Operational Risks to
Chevron Corporation from Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco, AMAZON WATCH 1, 1–17 (May 11,
2011)
http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/ChevronEcuador_Risk_Analysis_Report_May2011.pdf.
37. See infra Part II (discussing origins of “greenwashing” and potential legal
implications).
38. See infra Part III (proposing ways to police “greenwashing” and faux CSR more
effectively).
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to help the environment by reusing towels.39 While the hotel’s stated
purpose was to reduce water, energy, and detergent use, Westerveld
suspected its true motivation was profit.40 A play on “whitewashing”—
using white paint to cover over dirt in a superficial or transparent way—the
term “greenwashing” soon came to signify insincere, dubious, inflated, or
misleading environmental claims.41 Various environmental groups have
similarly objected to the current widespread use of the word “green” for
products and services that do not truly or meaningfully benefit the
environment.42 Indeed, it seems that many products, services, and
companies now boast some shade of “green”—even companies in “dirty”
industries, who often proclaim their dedication to the environment the
loudest.43
By contrast, many companies genuinely engage in corporate social
responsibility (or CSR).44 These firms strive to create returns for their
shareholders, good products and services for their customers, good jobs and
wages for their employees and communities, and benefit the public by
treading lightly on (or even improving) the natural environment.45 In
serving all of these corporate constituencies, and taking a broad view of the
firm’s best interests, a company often benefits financially.46 Studies have
39. See Alice Rawsthorn, The Toxic Side of Being, Literally, Green, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/05/arts/05ihtdesign5.html?scp=1&sq=the%20toxic%20side%20of%20being%20literally%20green&st=cse
(crediting Westerveld with coining the term “greenwashing”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
40. See id.
41. See id. (“These days [greenwashing] refers to anyone who makes fake environmental
claims.”).
42. Cf. Tom Wright, False “Green” Ads Draw Global Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30,
2008, at B4, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120163622342426091.html
(discussing the difficulties of policing inaccurate “green” ads). Today many of these
environmental groups receive corporate support and have shied away from such accusations;
the more radical environmental groups including Greenpeace continue their criticism unabated.
See, e.g., John Vidal, Artists Prepare for BP Protest at Tate Britain, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.),
June 25, 2010, 2010 WLNR 12736937 (interviewing groups protesting BP’s “cuddly”
manufactured corporate persona).
43. See Beate Sjåfjell, Regulating Companies as if the World Matters: Reflections from
the Ongoing Sustainable Companies Project, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2011)
(remarking that “the ugliest companies wear the most makeup”); see also Carol Elliott, ND
Management Professor Earns “Best Paper” Award for Greenwashing Research, UNIVERSITY
OF NOTRE DAME MENDOZA SCHOOL OF BUSINESS (Nov. 22, 2010), available at
http://business.nd.edu/faculty_and_research/article.aspx?id=8012 (describing Sarv Devaraj &
Suvrat Dhanorkar, Do As I Say Not As I Do: An Empirical Examination of the Relationship
Between Corporate Sustainability Beliefs and Performance, which found a negative correlation
between CSR rhetoric and environmental performance).
44. See Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 33, at 1013 n.160 (listing examples of genuine
CSR).
45. See id. at 1010–14 (describing ways in which corporations engage in CSR).
46. See id. at 1013–14 (noting the correlation between profitability and CSR).
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shown that CSR tends to break even and frequently turns a profit,47 which
comports with one’s general sense that consumers are willing to pay more
for organic, sustainably harvested, and/or environmentally gentle goods and
services.48
Several legal scholars have noted the problems that arise from
greenwashing and other forms of faux CSR.49 Driven to maximize shortterm profits,50 companies have an incentive to promise consumers “ecofriendly” products but deliver goods or services in the cheapest way
possible, regardless of environmental impact.51 While this description may
seem extreme or blatant, there is an unfortunately strong incentive to renege
on advertising promises to uncertain constituencies outside the company,
like the environment.52 Indeed, because of these issues, some commentators
have called for more disclosure of the true state of corporate environmental
records and for the creation of a remedy for fraudulent or misleading CSR
claims.53
Professor Cynthia Williams began this effort approximately ten years
ago, arguing in the Harvard Law Review that the SEC should require
publicly-traded companies to make accurate and standardized disclosures of
their social and environmental performance.54 More recently, Professor
Michael Siebecker agreed but noted that false CSR advertising,
commercials, and social responsibility reports might easily mislead
47. See id. at 1013 (citing various studies); see also Michael C. Jensen, Value
Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 22 J. OF APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 32, 32–41 (2001) (positing that a firm best maximizes its long-term value by tending
to all of its stakeholder groups).
48. See Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 33, at 1002–03 (noting consumer willingness to
pay more for socially responsible goods and services).
49. See id. at 1026–27 (citing scholarship).
50. See Judd F. Sneirson, Shareholder Profits and the Sustainable Corporation, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 541, 556 (2011) [hereinafter Sneirson, Shareholder Profits] (identifying
the market forces that encourage corporate managers to focus on short-term stock price).
51. See Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 33, at 1026–28 (discussing incentives to produce
short-term profits).
52. See id. at 1026–28 (noting these incentives).
53. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The SEC and Corporate Social Transparency, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1293–1306 (1999) (proposing that SEC mandate disclosure of
environmental information, thus providing a check against inflated advertising claims);
Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an Institutional Approach
to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 618–19 (2006) (suggesting that First
Amendment jurisprudence does not protect misleading corporate political speech from
mandatory disclosure securities laws); Janet E. Kerr, The Creative Capitalism Spectrum:
Evaluating CSR Through a Legal Lens, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 831, 834–42 (2008) [hereinafter
Kerr, Creative Capitalism] (contemplating corporate liability for “greenwashing” under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act).
54. See Williams, supra note 53, at 1293–1306 (proposing that the SEC mandate
disclosure of environmental information, thus providing a check against inflated advertising
claims).
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investors.55 And two years ago, Professor Janet Kerr began sketching the
preliminary contours of what an action under Rule 10b-5 for misleading or
faux CSR might look like.56
In our previous article, we criticized BP as a “free rider” on the CSR
efforts of other firms and argued that BP undeservingly enjoyed the
public’s goodwill toward companies involved in socially responsible
practices.57 The gap that BP so effectively exploited—taking advantage of
the public relations upside of CSR without actually expending the time or
money to integrate or engage in it—is particularly troublesome in that it
might ultimately erode the positive sentiment enjoyed by companies
actually engaged in meaningful CSR.58 We then suggested a number of
avenues for policing greenwashing and faux CSR, which we revisit here:
remedies under false advertising laws; claims under the securities-fraud
laws; the newly established Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection,
which could play a major role in policing CSR claims; and private standardsetting by independent organizations or other groups.59 We review their
basic elements below and in Part III apply them to Chevron’s “we agree”
campaign.

55. See Siebecker, supra note 53, at 618–19 (suggesting that First Amendment
jurisprudence does not protect misleading corporate political speech from mandatory disclosure
securities laws).
56. See Kerr, Creative Capitalism, supra note 53, at 839–42 (applying Rule 10b–5 to
materially misleading CSR statements). Some of Professor Kerr’s other proposals are far more
radical. For example, in a 2009 article, she argues that the government might want to choose to
mandate CSR in some instances, for example, when a multinational corporation engages in
various functions in a third-world country that make it more akin to a government than a
corporation. See Janet E. Kerr, A New Era of Responsibility: A Modern American Mandate for
CSR, 78 UMKC L. REV. 327, 333–34 (2009) (arguing that Congress has the authority to set
corporate social responsibilities under the Commerce Clause); see also David Monsma & John
Buckley, Non-Financial Corporate Performance: The Material Edges of Social and
Environmental Disclosure, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVT’L L. 151, 182–93 (2004) (arguing that
corporate statements about the extent of their CSR programs could in some instances be
material). Others have noted that corporate “codes of ethics” could also potentially be subject
to liability as a form of false advertising if the company’s executives fail to comply with the
codes. See Su-Ping Lu, Corporate Codes of Conduct and the FTC: Advancing Human Rights
Through Deceptive Advertising Law, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 603, 619–28 (2000)
(discussing the elements necessary to enforce corporate conduct through the FTC).
57. See Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 33, at 1036 (arguing that BP benefited from other
companies’ genuine CSR by advertising their faux CSR).
58. See id. at 1026–27 (citing Professors Williams, Siebecker, and Kerr’s articles on
CSR and greenwashing).
59. See id. at 1025–35 (discussing possible legal claims against companies employing
faux CSR).
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A. False Advertising

To allege a claim for unfair trade practices, false advertising, or
consumer fraud, one must typically show a representation, omission, or
practice that is likely to mislead or deceive potential consumers; the
representation, omission, or practice must be material, meaning it is likely
to affect consumers’ buying decisions; and the representation, omission, or
practice must cause consumers some injury.60
There are few such reported cases dealing with corporate claims of
social responsibility, and those that have been brought typically concern
specific product labeling asserting the product is “green.”61 For example,
successful claims have been made as against insecticide companies who
labeled their products as safe or environmentally friendly when that was not
the case.62 Cases have also been brought challenging the use of the word
“recycled,” “recyclable,” or “biodegradable,” which all now have strict
legal definitions.63 Although these cases dealt with false representation
claims concerning product labeling, a false advertising case around an
environmental claim could be seen as analogous.
Perhaps the most prominent case involving greenwashing and faux
CSR is Kasky v. Nike.64 There, activist plaintiffs brought an action under
California’s false advertising law against Nike for making assertions about
its labor practices, which action the lower courts summarily dismissed on
free-speech grounds.65 Holding that Nike’s assertions were commercial
speech and thus subject to a lower level of constitutional protection, the
California Supreme Court remanded the case for further factual findings to

60. See IQ Prods. Co. v. Pennzoil Prods. Co., 305 F.3d 368, 370 (5th Cir. 2002)
(interpreting section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2006), which
regulates false or misleading descriptions of fact in connection with commerce of goods and
services); see also Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2002) (analyzing Nike’s
statements about its labor practices under California law), cert. granted, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
Many states provide similar protections. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 2001 &
Supp. 2011) (regulating consumer fraud); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (2009) (regulating
unfair trade practices).
61. See Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New Corporate
Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 646 (2001) (identifying specific claims against
green labeling).
62. See id. (referencing cases involving misleading environmental advertising claims);
see also John M. Church, A Market Solution to Green Marketing: Some Lessons from the
Economics of Information, 79 MINN. L. REV. 245, 301–04 (1994) (same).
63. See 16 C.F.R. Part 260 (2011) (setting forth the Federal Trade Commission’s “Green
Guides” for the use of environmental labels in marketing); Church, supra note 62, at 305–06
(referring to cases involving terms such as “degradable,” “biodegradable,” “environmentally
safe,” and “ozone friendly”).
64. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
65. See id. at 249 (summarizing the case’s procedural history).
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see if Nike’s statements were, indeed, false.66 The California Supreme
Court stated:
Our holding, based on decisions of the United States Supreme Court, in
no way prohibits any business enterprise from speaking out on issues of
public importance or from vigorously defending its own labor practices.
It means only that when a business enterprise, to promote and defend its
sales and profits, makes factual representations about its own products
or its own operations, it must speak truthfully. 67

The case eventually settled out of court with Nike promising to fix
various labor issues, subject itself to third-party monitoring, and make a
monetary payment to a worker’s advocacy non-profit group.68 While many
commentators have lauded Kasky v. Nike as a promising avenue to keep
corporations to their word regarding worker rights,69 the result is more
tantalizing than fulfilling, as the Supreme Court of the United States never
ruled on the issue.
That said, the issue likely remains an open one: if “green” claims were
a significant part of a company’s consumer marketing and consumers did,
in fact, rely on false statements, the corporation’s claims would not be
entitled to an absolute First Amendment free-speech defense.70 Instead,
such statements would only be accorded the (lesser) deference afforded to
commercial speech.71 State governments may regulate commercial speech
that is false or misleading,72 and consumer reliance on false green
advertising could form the basis of private actions for false advertising and
consumer fraud.73 Thus, if consumers could show that they purchased
gasoline or other goods and services on the basis of green advertising
66. See id. at 262 (not deciding whether Nike’s speech was false or misleading).
67. Id. at 247.
68. See Adam Liptak, Nike Move Ends Case Over Firms’ Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 2003, at A8 (discussing how Nike’s settlement ended what was expected to be a
landmark ruling on free speech).
69. For a sampling of commentary about Kasky v. Nike, see generally Robert L. Kerr,
From Sullivan to Nike: Will the Noble Purpose of the Landmark Free Speech Case Be
Subverted to Immunize False Advertising, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 525 (2004); Tamara R. Piety,
Grounding Nike: Exposing Nike’s Quest for a Constitutional Right to Lie, 78 TEMP. L. REV.
151 (2005); Michele Sutton, Between a Rock and a Judicial Hard Place: Corporate Social
Responsibility Reporting and Potential Legal Liability Under Kasky v. Nike, 72 UMKC L.
REV. 1159 (2004); Samuel A. Terilli, Nike v. Kasky and the Running-But-Going-Nowhere
Commercial Speech Debate, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 383 (2005); David C. Vladeck, Lessons
from a Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1049 (2004).
70. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247–49 (Cal. 2002) (concluding Nike’s
statements are commercial speech).
71. See id. at 247.
72. See id. (noting permissible limitations on commercial speech).
73. See supra notes 39–59 and accompanying text (discussing the background of
greenwashing and faux CSR).
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claims that turned out not to be true, they would be entitled to recover the
amount that they paid as compared to prices for similar goods and services,
together with any other damages as provided in the relevant statutes.
B. Securities Fraud
A second cause of action could lie with investors under Section 10(b)74
and Rule 10b-575 for securities fraud. Rule 10b-5 requires that a plaintiff
show a material misstatement or actionable omission of fact, made with
scienter, on which another justifiably relies, causing damages.76 Securities
fraud additionally requires that the fraud be “in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security” per the statute;77 if the security is traded on
an efficient market such as the New York Stock Exchange, reliance can be
presumed under the “fraud on the market theory”;78 and, regarding
causation, the plaintiff must show both that the misstatement or omission
caused the purchase or sale (transaction causation) and that the
misstatement or omission caused the complained-of loss (loss causation).79
A recent Sixth Circuit case highlights a difficult obstacle for faux CSR
claims alleging securities fraud: materiality.80 There, shareholders sued the
Ford Motor Company alleging securities fraud in connection with the
company’s statements regarding the safety of the Ford Explorer’s tires.81
Plaintiffs noted that they were in part suing Ford for calling itself a
“socially responsible company” while simultaneously marketing products
that were dangerous.82 The court was not moved by Ford’s claim that it was
“a leader in corporate social responsibility”:
Such statements are either mere corporate puffery or hyperbole that a
reasonable investor would not view as significantly changing the
general gist of available information, and thus, are not material, even if
they were misleading. All public companies praise their products and
74. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j–2 (2010) (prohibiting
securities fraud).
75. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2011) (prohibiting securities fraud).
76. Compare WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS
§ 105 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (listing the elements of common-law fraud),
with Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (listing the elements of securities
fraud), and Dura Pharm. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (same).
77. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
78. See Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 241–48 (endorsing the fraud-on-the-market theory).
79. See Dura Pharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 341–42 (distinguishing between transaction
causation and loss causation and requiring both).
80. See In re Ford Motor Co., 381 F.3d 563, 570–71 (6th Cir. 2004) (analyzing whether
Ford’s statements were material); see also Monsma & Buckley, supra note 56, at 115
(discussing materiality); Kerr, Creative Capitalism, supra note 53, at 857 (same).
81. See In re Ford Motor Co., 381 F.3d at 570–71 (relating plaintiffs’ allegations).
82. Id. at 569.
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their objectives. Courts everywhere “have demonstrated a willingness to
find immaterial as a matter of law a certain kind of rosy affirmation
commonly heard from corporate managers and numbingly familiar to
the marketplace—loosely optimistic statements that are so vague, so
lacking in specificity, or so clearly constituting the opinions of the
speaker, that no reasonable investor could find them important to the
total mix of information available.”83

Thus, even if a faux CSR challenge can successfully point to a company’s
false statement, that statement might be immaterial as a matter of law on the
ground that it is just meaningless hyperbolic puffery.84
We suggested in our earlier article that this materiality hurdle might be
overcome on appropriate facts.85 We noted that, as socially conscious
investing continues to increase in volume and popularity,86 “a large
institutional investor or a class of socially responsible mutual funds may
have a more objective basis for relying on non-financial company
statements, policies and practices.”87 These sorts of funds explicitly make
investment decisions based on more than just financial performance and
place credence on statements about a company’s social and environmental
activities.88 It would be wrong to say that CSR would be immaterial to such
an investment decision, notwithstanding the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in the
quoted passage.
A second, smaller hurdle for faux CSR securities fraud claims involves
causation. As noted above, a plaintiff in a securities fraud action must prove
both that the misstatement caused the plaintiffs to purchase or sell the
company’s security and that the misstatement of fact relates to the
complained-of loss.89 As applied to BP or Chevron, this means that an
investor was motivated to buy or sell their stock on the basis of the
companies’ environmental platitudes. Such a plaintiff would also have to

83. Id. at 570–71 (quoting Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1217 (1st Cir.
1996)). On puffery generally, see David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA
L. REV. 1395 (2006).
84. See Hoffman, supra note 83, at 1407 (noting a Fourth Circuit determination that a
company’s statement about future earnings was immaterial puffery).
85. See Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 33, at 1032 (discussing how, as socially
conscious investing increases, the materiality hurdle may not seem insurmountable).
86. See generally George Djurasovic, The Regulation of Socially Responsible Mutual
Funds, 22 J. CORP. L. 257 (1997) (noting the increasing popularity of socially conscious
investing).
87. See Monsma & Buckley, supra note 56, at 189 (discussing how a company’s nonfinancial commitments can create investor expectations).
88. See id. at 169 (noting that investment firms assess environmental performance and
overall corporate responsibility).
89. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (noting the transaction and loss causation
requirements).
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show loss causation, that BP’s or Chevron’s stock price subsequently fell
because it did not live up to its environmental claims.
C. Dodd-Frank
A third possibility for policing CSR claims may be on the horizon. In
July of 2010, Congress enacted a number of historic financial reforms as
part of the Dodd-Frank Act.90 Section 1011 of the Act enables the
establishment of a Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection to “regulate
the offering and provision of consumer financial products or services under
the Federal consumer financial laws.”91 The statutory language concerning
consumer education, appropriate disclosure, and tracking of consumer
complaints92 could overlap with faux CSR and greenwashing, as these are
consumer-information issues and accurate disclosure could certainly
influence consumers’ informed investment decisions. Further, educating
consumers about their rights should include helping consumers understand
whether their purchases will advance the causes they believe in. That can
only be done through accurate disclosure. As the legislation and the Bureau
are still so new, it is difficult to know how the various provisions will be
enforced and what litigation they will generate. That said, it is intriguing to
think about the possibility that the new agency might include accurate
corporate social responsibility information as one aspect of its consumerfraud agenda.93
D. Certifications
A fourth means of policing corporate claims of social responsibility
draws on certifications. Many public and private certifications currently
exist, verifying that foods are organic or kosher,94 that products are fairly
90. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–
203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010).
91. Id. § 1011.
92. See id. §§ 1031–37 (delineating the actions the Bureau may take against unfair,
deceptive, or abusive acts or practices).
93. See generally Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 33, at 1034.
94. See National Organic Program, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. MKTG. SERV.,
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/nop (last visited Sept. 7, 2011) (describing the regulations
and process for certifying USDA organic products) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment); see also Certification Services, QUALITY
ASSURANCE INT’L, http://www.qai-inc.com/services/certification_services.asp (last visited Sept.
7, 2011) (explaining QAI’s certification programs) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment); Overview of Oregon Tilth, OR. TILTH,
http://tilth.org/about (last visited Sept. 7, 2011) (describing the nonprofit organization’s goal of
supporting socially equitable agriculture through certification) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment); OUKosher.Org: The World’s Most
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traded or meet certain qualities,95 that buildings meet certain “green”
standards,96 that wood and paper products are sustainably harvested,97 and
that companies adhere to environmental and social-responsibility
standards.98 Certifying organizations typically license their marks to those
who meet their standards, permitting them to display the marks on products
and in advertisements, sometimes in exchange for some amount of
compensation.99
These and other marks can be used to verify corporations’ socialresponsibility claims for consumers and investors.100 B Labs, the owner of
the “B Corporation” mark, already offers something similar, certifying and
licensing corporations that adhere to its standards of environmental and
social benevolence.101 The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection or
another federal agency could also develop uniform corporate social
responsibility standards and designate private organizations to verify
compliance with them, as the Department of Agriculture did for organic
food.102 Such marks could offer consumers and investors a verifiable option
for identifying and comparing socially responsible companies and products
and offer companies wishing to proclaim their CSR bona fides a credible
way to do so.

Recognized & Trusted Kosher Trademark, ORTHODOX UNION, http://www.oukosher.org (last
visited Sept. 7, 2011) (describing the O-U hechsher and mark) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
95. See FAIR TRADE USA, http://www.transfairusa.org (last visited Sept. 7, 2011)
(defining what fair trade is and what the Fair Trade Certified label represents) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment); see also About the
Good Housekeeping Seal: How Our Magazine and the GH Seal Protect You, GOOD
HOUSEKEEPING,
http://www.goodhousekeeping.com/product-testing/history/about-goodhousekeeping-seal (last visited Sept. 7, 2011) (describing the Good Housekeeping seal) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
96. See U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/leed (last visited Sept. 7,
2011) (describing the LEED building designations) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
97. See FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.fsc.org (last visited Sept. 7, 2011)
(describing the FSC certification process) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
98. See Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New
Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 1017–19 (2009) [hereinafter
Sneirson, Green is Good] (discussing the “B Corporation” and how its mark signifies that a
business meets certain high standards of social and environmental performance).
99. See, e.g., id. (describing the “B Corporation” mark and arrangement).
100. See Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 33, at 1034 (discussing how the private
certification model can help to police corporate claims of social responsibility).
101. See Sneirson, Green is Good, supra note 98, at 1017–19 (describing the “B
Corporation” mark and arrangement).
102. See Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 33, at 1034–35 (discussing the development of
the USDA standards for organic-labeled food).
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E. Watchdogs

A final means of keeping corporate claims of CSR in check is through
“watchdogs,” like the activists who created the Chevron “we agree”
spoofs.103 Some see tremendous potential in these groups’ power to reign in
false CSR claims: “For the price of a URL and a little wit, a campaign that
is out of step with reality can be hacked and become more of a liability than
a potential benefit.”104 Of course, where a company or its environmental
record is not in the public eye, the company is less likely to draw these
individuals’ ire.105 Whether such a deterrent is enough to put an end to false
claims of CSR remains to be seen, but this may prove a promising method
for policing corporate greenwashing.
III. Analysis of the “We Agree” Campaign
In this Part, we now reexamine Chevron’s “we agree” campaign106 and
analyze how such a campaign might fit into our framework for addressing
greenwashing and faux CSR.107
Chevron’s “we agree” campaign and website are in many ways at odds
with its Ecuadorean activities.108 Chevron says that oil companies should
protect the environment, that it does protect the environment, that it “places
the highest priority on . . . the environment,”109 and that it conducts itself in a
socially responsible and ethical manner.110 Chevron also states that it strives
to “make a difference” in the communities where it does business, improving
people’s “health . . . and welfare,” and generally supporting and benefiting

103. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text (describing how activists responded to
Chevron’s “we agree” campaign).
104. See Werbach, supra note 11 (“As times go on these sorts of campaigns will begin to
diminish.”).
105. See Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 33, at 1002–04 (noting how, before its 2010 oil
spill in the Gulf of Mexico, BP was largely admired by environmental groups and others for its
perceived earth-friendly approach to doing business).
106. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text (discussing the “we agree” campaign).
107. See supra Part II (setting forth our framework for policing greenwashing and faux
CSR).
108. Chevron has also recently drawn criticism from environmentalists and a surprising
number of its own shareholders for “fracking”—the controversial drilling method that involves
injecting water and chemicals deep underground to fracture rock and release natural gas
deposits. See Cassandra Sweet, Chevron Investors Defeat Fracking Proposal, MARKET
WATCH (May 25, 2011, 6:14 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/chevron-investorsdefeat-fracking-proposal-2011-05-25 (last visited Sept. 7, 2011) (noting approximately 40% of
Chevron shareholders voted in favor of the shareholder proposal) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
109. Supra note 9 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (describing Chevron’s vision and values).
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“the communities [it is] part of.”111 These claims are complicated and depend
on the timeframe being examined. For example, Chevron may follow these
precepts even if Texaco did not during its tenure in Ecuador.112
Other Chevron statements seem questionable upon closer inspection.
For example, Chevron may invest millions of dollars on renewable
alternatives to fossil fuels,113 but that is comparatively little for a company
with a market capitalization of over $200 billion, and the company tellingly
balances this statement with a reaffirmation of the importance of oil
exploration and production.114 Chevron also says that it puts its profits to
good use, but includes in that description paying its employees’ salaries
(including $16 million to its CEO in 2010) and issuing its shareholders
dividends each quarter.115 And in its statement about “protecting people and
the environment” the company incongruously adds a reference to its assets:
“We place the highest priority on the health and safety of our workforce and
protection of our assets and the environment.”116 In other words, many of
Chevron’s pro-CSR messages in fact reveal the company’s more or less
conventional way of doing business.
The value Chevron places on its assets is perhaps most apparent in its
defense of the Ecuadorean lawsuit.117 Whereas Chevron writes on its website,
“We accept responsibility and hold ourselves accountable for our work and
our actions” and “respect the law,”118 its litigation strategy calls these claims
into question. From the very outset of the Ecuadorean action, the company
has disclaimed, not accepted, responsibility for its predecessor’s
environmental actions, and now that the Ecuadorean court it sought to hear
the case has found the company liable, Chevron is fighting around the globe

111. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (explaining the “Chevron Way”).
112. See supra notes 18, 23–25 and accompanying text (noting the timing of the pollution
in Ecuador and Chevron’s acquisition of Texaco).
113. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (quoting Chevron’s “we agree” campaign
about the company’s investments in geothermal, biofuel, and solar technologies).
114. Compare supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing Chevron’s time and
financial commitment to renewable energy), with Chevron Corp., GOOGLE FIN.,
http://www.google.com/finance?q=NYSE:CVX (last visited Sept. 8, 2011) (listing Chevron’s
financial information).
115. Compare supra note 6 and accompanying text (quoting Chevron’s statement about
putting its profits to good use), with Chevron Corp., GOOGLE FIN., supra note 114 (containing
information on Chevron’s executive compensation and dividend history), and Chevron Corp.
(CVX), REUTERS, http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/officerProfile?symbol=CVX (last
visited Sept. 8, 2011) (same).
116. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (describing Chevron’s position on
protecting people, its workers, and the environment).
117. See supra notes 15–26 and accompanying text (describing the Ecuadorean plaintiffs’
lawsuit).
118. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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to prevent plaintiffs from collecting the judgment.119 Defending the lawsuit
and appealing the trial court’s decision are of course not inconsistent with
integrity, but prolonging the lawsuit for nearly twenty years in order to
outspend and outlast its adversaries, and now working to deny plaintiffs even
a rightful recovery, goes well beyond any definition of accepting
responsibility.
Still, there might be obstacles to customers wishing to bring a false
advertising action based on these statements and actions. As the Nike case
demonstrates, Chevron could not avoid such a claim on First Amendment
grounds and would have to defend it on its merits.120 But, on the merits,
Chevron could argue that even if it made false representations, they were
meaningless puffery and in any event not material to a consumer’s gasoline
purchase.121 This argument would track the argument Ford successfully made
in the securities-fraud case discussed above,122 and its likelihood of success
would turn on a court’s opinion of eco-conscious consumers’ choices.123
Chevron investors might also encounter difficulty using Chevron’s
advertising campaign and website124 as the basis for a securities-fraud
action.125 Plaintiffs might be able to show both transaction and loss causation,
assuming they purchased Chevron stock as a result of the company’s green
advertising campaigns and Chevron’s stock price dropped as a result of the
Ecuador lawsuit. However, even if Chevron shareholders could successfully
prove the company’s CSR statements intentionally misleading, the statements
might be deemed immaterial in that they would not have altered the “total
mix of information” about the company considering its newsworthy litigation
efforts in Ecuador.126

119. See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text (noting Chevron’s appeal and other
efforts to prevent enforcement of a judgment in the Ecuadorean action).
120. See supra notes 64–69 and accompanying text (discussing the Nike case).
121. See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text (discussing a Sixth Circuit case’s
materiality analysis).
122. See id.
123. Based on the boycott of BP in the summer of 2010, there is evidence to suggest that
consumers indeed change their gasoline consumption patterns on factors other than price.
124. See Advertising, supra note 1 (linking to Chevron’s advertising campaign).
125. Again, we do not discuss Chevron’s exposure to securities-fraud liability based on its
SEC disclosures concerning the Ecuadorean lawsuit. See Billenness & Lewis, supra note 36, at
13–16 (analyzing possible securities-fraud claims against Chevron regarding the Ecuadorean
litigation).
126. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (discussing
materiality and whether statements in question altered the “total mix of information”).
Ironically, the spoofed ads and public criticism contributed to the total mix of information on
Chevron’s Ecuadorean activities, as well. By contrast, before the BP oil spill, the total mix of
information probably did not include the environmental and safety risks that BP undertook.
See Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 33, at 1008 (noting the favorable impression BP enjoyed
before the Deepwater Horizon disaster).
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Given these obstacles, increased government regulation and mandated
disclosure might be more useful in preventing faux CSR. CSR reporting,
whether done voluntarily or mandated by the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection, can provide objective, verifiable information on a company’s
activities as opposed to the empty puff or vaguely positive statements many
advertisements feature.127 And while puffery might be enough to escape
false-advertising or securities-fraud liability, auditors for certification
organizations and environmental activists may be less easily fooled and better
positioned to hold CSR-boasting firms accountable to their promises.128
IV. Conclusion
All too often, the statements and promises of CSR have been found to
be overblown blandishments, the afterthought of a clever marketing
department, or part of a public-relations effort to control damage through
greenwashing. That seems to be the case with Chevron’s “we agree”
campaign, which is particularly unfortunate in that such faux CSR can
breed cynicism toward genuine CSR and the firms that actively engage in
it. Corporate claims of social responsibility need to be policed, and the
Chevron example demonstrates that civil actions by consumers and
investors cannot do the job alone. Certifying organizations and watchdog
groups can pick up some of this slack, restoring trust with consumers and
investors who wish to do business with socially responsible and sustainable
businesses. CSR disclosures can also play an important role, transforming
corporate communications that would otherwise raise suspicions of
greenwashing into informative and reliable accounts of corporate behavior.

127. See supra Part II.C (analyzing the Dodd-Frank provisions that could form the basis
of CSR disclosure requirements).
128. See supra Parts II.D & II.E (discussing certifications and watchdog groups).
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